

Introduction: Perpetual War

SRINIVAS ARAVAMUDAN

War [polemos] is both father of all and king of all: it reveals the gods on the one hand and humans on the other, makes slaves on the one hand, the free on the other.

—Heraclitus, fragment 53

See, there is only a single character. It is the barbarian character war, but it has other senses too. It can stand for vengeance, and if you turn it upside down like this, it can be made to read justice. There is no knowing which sense is intended. That is part of barbarian cunning.

—J. M. Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians* (112)

H ERACLITUS'S FRAGMENT 53 DESCRIBES WAR AS AN ORIGINAL and universal human condition: war generates hierarchy, status, and masculinity.¹ Is the ubiquity of war across societies a shared structure of feeling? If so, a comprehensive approach to the perpetuity of war would nonetheless need to engage with war-related evidence from multiple histories and avoid hasty generalization: from the corroboration of organized violence to the strategic intentions behind it, from the development of new weaponry to the destruction such innovations wreak, from the lead-up to war through political rhetoric to the performance of war on and off the battlefield, and from depictions of chivalric glory after a war is over to the gory truths that such stories inevitably suppress. As agonistic sociopolitical endeavors with concrete life spans, historical wars produce meanings different from the myth of generalized chaos, described by the early modern political philosopher Thomas Hobbes as a "state of meer Nature" or "continuall feare, and danger of violent death" (140, 89). War as an abstraction does not make sense without the layered histories of the lives—and deaths—of individuals and collectivities, states and sovereignties.

SRINIVAS ARAVAMUDAN is dean of humanities at Duke University and professor in the Department of English and the Program in Literature. The author of *Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688–1804* (Duke UP, 1999; MLA Prize for a First Book) and *Guru English: South Asian Religion in a Cosmopolitan Language* (Princeton UP, 2006), he is finishing a book on Enlightenment orientalism and also writing on Hobbes, sovereignty, and anachronism.

Ancient wars of religion that endorse the massacre of infidels intersect uneasily with heroic combat under chivalric values, and modern battle operations involving pincer movements have to be evaluated alongside the slaughter of civilians that results from military tactics. Because the history of war is inseparable from the progress of technology, the meaning of war changes dramatically as killing machines and human lifeworlds increasingly imbricate each other. *War* names an unconcealment that Martin Heidegger called *technē*.²

As war traverses the historical record, there are symmetrical consequences to the understanding of peace, whether as temporary cease-fire, social well-being, or projected utopia. The contributions to this issue address how literature or performance documents and alters the meanings of war and peace. We might ask whether any humanistic discipline, such as military history, the anthropology of conflict, or political philosophy—or, for that matter, war-related literary and cultural criticism in *PMLA*—can ever grasp adequately the changing perceptions and experiences of war over time. As mass combat and social sacrifice, war is both real-life and theatrical performance, an event that can include the planet in “scenarios,” such as those involving nuclear war.³

While the waging of war has changed radically from the era of Heraclitus to that of Hiroshima and beyond, what can be said about war’s impact on theory and philosophy through simulations encouraged by rational choice, game theory, and virtual reality since Carl von Clausewitz and Henri de Jomini? Strategic thought has morphed in social-scientific as well as mathematical directions, and the phenomenological experience of war comprises the real, the imagined, and the virtual.⁴ Is there a posthuman future of war without the body and beyond the animal, a war of machine against machine, of the unmanned drone against the robot soldier, without the infliction of organic pain and death? Science fiction dabbles in these futures even as we ac-

knowledge the ongoing devastation of many polities by war today. Wars involve intentional human actions—along with unintended consequences and accidental occurrences. What if we ask, in this anniversary year of Charles Darwin, whether war is a form of unnatural selection that influences the biological record alongside vaster cataclysms such as extinction (Barta)? If the timescale of extinction was always thought to be beyond war’s (and history’s) limited causal frameworks, nuclear weapons have brought humanity to the brink of that abyss. The perpetuity of war leads us to confront cosmogony with psychology and moral philosophy with evolutionary anthropology. Tracing war from questions about everyday politics to those about species death could lead us to speculate about the purposiveness of human habitation on the planet in the shadow of our increasing capacity for self-annihilation. To ask about war today is to reflect not just on past devastations and current human suffering but also on our indeterminate bio-ontological and ecotechnical future as a quarrelsome and death-delivering species. Investigating the perpetuity of war as an idea, we can wonder along with J. M. Coetzee’s unnamed magistrate in *Waiting for the Barbarians* whether war is about vengeance, justice, or “barbarian cunning” (112). Ranging comparatively from ancient to modern to contemporary times, I conclude with our late capitalist situation amid planetary devastation, wherein war appears to be an ineradicable evil. As technology vaults over psychology, a theory of perpetual war involves a speculative leap toward considering how the indeterminacy of biopolitical and technopolitical futures may lead us beyond any known explanations of why war occurs.

Heraclitus reminds us that the perpetuity of war is no novel development. Even if the technology of military engagement in early times was rudimentary, ancient epics frequently depict war as annihilating peoples,

animals, and ecologies. Many founding mythologies alternately celebrate and lament the imminence of civilizational collapse through human and divine violence. Wars helped found and destroy city-states. If the hero Gilgamesh and his ancestors fortified Uruk through war against the rival city of Aratta, the Hellenic bards sang of the wrenching destruction of Troy. Even as Vergil made that destruction the motor for Aeneas's founding of Rome, the Hebraic scribes documented the endless wanderings of the Jews after their various expulsions.

The *Mahabharata*, the world's longest literary work, is organized around the buildup to an earth-shattering war. This Sanskrit epic (or poem, or history) represents a dynastic dispute that causes universal breakdown. As Romila Thapar discusses eloquently in this issue, the text moves from a clan-based to a caste-based ethos. War in the *Mahabharata* irrevocably pits cousin against cousin. Faced with the quandary of whether to fight or flee before the carnage begins, the warrior Arjuna is hectored by his charioteer, Krishna, in the sacred interpolation known as the Bhagavadgita. Counseling Arjuna that fighting was his ascribed duty, or dharma, Krishna reveals his divine form with the revelatory announcement "I am Time grown old to destroy the world" ("kālo'smi lokakṣayakṛt prvṛddho"; 11.32). Indeed, the architect of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer, explicitly linked this quotation with the feeling of exultation he had when testing the first nuclear device in the New Mexican desert. Annihilation produces a sublime melancholy taking the strategic observer beyond social being (Aravamudan, *Guru English* 142–83). Yet justifications of war were also contested robustly in ancient India. The Bhagavadgita might have been a coded rejoinder to Jaina and Buddhist nonviolent attitudes that were challenging Brahman and Kshatriya hegemony (Fitzgerald 112).⁵ The emperor Asoka of the Maurya dynasty embraced Buddhism in 260 BCE af-

ter winning a brutal war against the Kalinga kingdom. If the official adoption of Buddhism under Asoka was an act of contrition by a victor with a guilty conscience, the renunciatory *śramaṇa* traditions aimed to mitigate the endemic violence in human and also interspecies behavior. Violence, however, does not fully end; it is more diffuse than war.

Ancient texts on the theory of war vary from metaphysical and casuistical texts like the Bhagavadgita to practical treatises that advise kings and generals, such as Aeneias's *Tactics*, Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, or Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Of these, *The Art of War*, compiled as a military treatise (*bingfa*) during the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE) in China, appears to be the most widely appreciated today, by business executives as much as military strategists. Sun Tzu's broadly Taoist framework suggests a parsimonious metaphysics of war when compared with the *Mahabharata*. Sun Tzu portrays war as a psychological contest involving swift decisions and resolutions. During this period of infantry movements with Iron Age weapons and some horse-drawn chariots, victory could be achieved by preparatory assessment and intelligence gathering, as well as managerial techniques and psychological maneuvers. Given unsustainable supply lines and unreliable military morale, the treatise preaches thrift in the use of matériel and promotes the minimal use of force. Espionage is emphasized: knowing oneself and one's opponent is the precondition to arming oneself. All this circumspection is needed because, ultimately, "[w]arfare is a way of deception" (78). The road to victory is paved with military and diplomatic feints: pretending to be weak when one is strong, near when far, and vice versa. Interactivity camouflages real intentions. By starting off conventionally but becoming unconventional, the general wins by surprise when mastering the tactical difficulties of terrain. An endless war of attrition is to be avoided at all costs. Since neither side can sustain the political will or the social

resources for long battles or perpetual war, military genius consists in optimizing benefits through lightning strikes and then consolidating the gains by declaring a truce.

Moving forward from ancient India and China to early modern Europe, we find Hobbes's *Leviathan* proposing the sovereignty of the modern state as a dignified protection racket. Hobbes dehistoricizes war, placing it in the prepolitical state of nature along with freedom; then he maneuvers the individual's fear of violent death into subjection to an omnipotent sovereign who unites law and legitimate violence. Of great significance to Hobbes was the experience of the English Civil War, though Thucydides and Tacitus also influenced him, as did reports about the indigenous inhabitants of North America, whose life, he notoriously wrote, was "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (89).⁶ Hobbes learned from Thucydides that war resulted in anarchy because of human vainglory. As a stoppage of orderly political life, war creates *stasis* in the place of harmonious social action, or *kinēsis*.⁷ Hobbes thus skillfully refashioned negative moral particulars into a positive outcome. The perpetuity of war was a direct function of the unchangeability of human psychology. Yet the same human beings could avoid the warlike state of nature when absorbed into an institution and its attendant social relations. The sovereign embraced the subject, relieving him from death with the expanded structure of the state. However, is this relieve a suspension that conscripts the subject for collectivized war?

This contract of security for quiescence was the ideal limit of the pacification project of the state, even though, as Norbert Elias points out, the result was state-sponsored war, taken to the unprecedented level that the planet has known since early modernity.⁸ The state's monopoly on legitimate violence suppressed cattle raids and banditry but gave sovereigns the right to wage war perpetually with each other and, with impunity, on their

own subjects. The state of nature was relegated to the space outside sovereign control. The Hobbesian solution to the problem of perpetual war was indeed a Pyrrhic victory: if subjects escaped the arbitrary violence of the state of nature, they were in turn swallowed into the composite figure of the Leviathan that adorns Hobbes's frontispiece, becoming part of the war machine that would be directed against other polities and the enemies of the state. This normalization of the logic of a world defined by state-centered conquest, with orderly centers and lawless peripheries, became a formal irony. Perpetual war was disguised as imperial peace: *pax Romana*, *pax Britannica*, *pax Americana*. The normal was, and is, the pathological.⁹

Immanuel Kant's famous essay "To Perpetual Peace" imagines the preexistence of war as instrumental when Nature dispersed humanity across the globe.¹⁰ Accepting the Hobbesian idea of war as existing in the state of nature, Kant proposes a rudimentary historicization of how differences of language and religion drove human beings to inhospitable regions and forced them to establish legal relations. Extreme conditions called for survival tactics. Ironically, human beings "are sufficiently occupied with their war against animals that they live in peace amongst themselves. But it was probably nothing but war that *drove* them there" (121). Civilization is linked to the prosecution of war: horses and elephants were domesticated from ancient times for the purposes of battle, and even the hybridization of grains and fruits for settled agriculture could occur only when some nations, through victory in war, had attained security of property, safety from attack, and the freedom to establish peaceful commercial relations. However, where war divided epochally, peace would unify perpetually: national divisions would eventually be superseded when commerce and cosmopolitan right established peaceful relationality. The Kantian philosopher enters the picture by legislating

the preliminary articles for a rational peace among warring states: there shall be no secret reservations when nations sign peace treaties; no acquisition of independent nations by inheritance, purchase, or gift; no standing armies; no national debt incurred for war making; no interference in the internal affairs of others; and no perfidious methods (such as assassination or poisoning) used during the conduct of war. Kant then proposes ways to reconstruct states progressively in perpetuity: promoting republicanism, proposing the right constitution, insisting on federative equality, supporting hospitality and freedom of movement, and creating cosmopolitan understanding. All nations may follow these rules of the Enlightenment by strengthening their own peaceful inclinations even as the same rules temper absolutist states that continue destructive behavior. Indeed, the philosopher's desire for enlightened despotism reaches comical absurdity when Kant suggests "a secret article for perpetual peace" wherein "*the maxims of philosophers concerning the conditions under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by nations armed for war*" (126). Going after the warmongers, the peacemonger turns into a perpetual dictator, resorting to the *arcana imperii* that republican and democratic practices were supposed to abolish. Claiming to turn swords into plowshares and dictators into democrats, the philosopher aspires to the perpetual sovereignty of reason.

Taking Hobbes's state-centered analysis of sovereignty as a given reality, Clausewitz rearticulates the conduct of war as a form of *raison d'état* (if we focus on book 1 of *On War*) or as an existential reality of great complexity (if we take note of the later books). The received Clausewitz is therefore a proponent of the state-centered ideology that war is limited and not perpetual, whereby we might hear his oft-quoted formula that war is the furtherance of politics or policy by other means ("Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik

mit anderen Mitteln" [*Vom Kriege*, bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 24]).¹¹ However, underneath this potentially hopeful thought that war may be not perpetual but limited, the text all the same acknowledges "a paradoxical trinity" ("wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit") of hatred, chance, and rational calculation in the trajectory of warfare. Granting each of the three tendencies (primordial violence, probability, and rational instrumentality) full play, Clausewitz hopes for "a theory [of war] that maintains a balance . . . like an object suspended between three magnets." While Clausewitzianism is state-centered, Clausewitz also recognized the crucial role played by primordial violence and historical contingencies in the unfolding of warfare. Group-engendered hatreds are "a blind natural force" in the manner of a collective id of the people, and the vagaries of chance evoke the Romantic ego, one in which "the creative spirit is free to roam" (sec. 28). The hyperrational third term becomes the repository of Hegelian state reason, a kind of superego. A new form of perpetuity emerges when Clausewitz separates war as a sociopolitical phenomenon from the technomilitary area of tactics and the creative, even artistic, area of imagining strategy. He asserts that war should be critically analyzed and understood in the manner of an endlessly recombinatory language whose meaning can therefore be determined to great subtlety through differential rather than inherent value: "Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic" (bk. 8, ch. 6B). We might well imagine the epigraph from Coetzee as a gloss on this passage: war is a complex sign system as well as a brute reality, and it can be implicated in revenge or justice, perhaps indeterminately as "barbarian cunning." David Kennedy demonstrates the developing indeterminacy of warmongering and

peacekeeping in his elegant study *Of War and Law*. For him, the grammar of war is nowadays closer to its logic, especially since lawfare has become a handmaiden of battlefield warfare through a convergence among humanitarianism, international law, and the felt need for all militaries to heed United Nations mandates concerning the use of force. The integration of humanitarianism with military force renders war perpetual yet again, even when ostensibly seeking to limit it.

The *energeia* that motivates war meets its match in brute materiality (“Friktion” [bk. 1]), and Clausewitz the strategist ineluctably concedes ground to those writers, such as Tolstoy, who focus on the folly and suffering perpetuated by war. By upsetting rational calculations, contingency plans, and options for retreat, war often defeats rather than realizes the agency of its planners, conscripts, and victims. Literature and art help change the framework. Aesthetic representations of war approach its horrors empathically from many standpoints and interrelations, whereas the detached perspectives of military planners make human beings into sacrificial pawns in a great game.¹²

Following in Clausewitz’s footsteps, Michel Foucault suggests that in the early modern period war is separated from law and right (it might be rejoined after the establishment of the United Nations), all so that states can preserve equilibrium with competing states. Through this amoral shift, “one is fully entitled to have a purely diplomatic reason for starting a war” (301). At the same time, the development of cameralistics produced the concept of the police, who returned the gaze of the sovereign to his own population and territory, for purposes of ensuring internal cohesion. Johann von Justi, author of *Grundsätze der Polizeiwissenschaft* (1756; “Foundations of the Science of Policing”), defines the police as “the set of laws and regulations that concern the interior of a state and which endeavor to strengthen and increase the power

of this state and make good use of its forces” (Foucault 314). The nexus between police and politics governs the domestic even as the military and the diplomatic corps intervene abroad. War is not just the external extension of policy by other means: policing and politics, for Foucault, are new versions of the permanent war among racial, religious, and ethnic groupings that has endured in Europe since the Middle Ages.

The presence of a permanent military establishment in every advanced state, the major outlays on weapons research and development, and the recalibration of military strategies speak to the permanence of war-making activities as “defense” (Clausewitz, bk. 6). War and peace interpenetrate today even as the militant posture of several states suggests wounded self-assertion. Overcompensating physical structures, like walls, delineate many national frontiers amid a widespread recognition that sovereignty is anachronistic while being undermined by new forms of biopower.¹³ As war leaks beyond state-centered intentions, a new question about the perpetuity of war arises. Continuing contests for domination and submission between recognizable enemies (Schmitt) are supplemented by technological overkill that could destroy the biosphere.

Freud’s essay “Why War?” argues on both sides of the question of whether perpetual peace is possible in a world used to the inescapability of war. Pointing out that the destructive and self-preservative instincts are intertwined in the human species and that therefore wars can result from a mixture of crass and noble motives, Freud makes both the Hobbesian point that “*l’union fait la force*” (“in unity lies strength”) and the Kantian one that civilization has inexorably evolved human beings toward pacifism, which is intellectually and aesthetically preferable to having conflicts settled violently (205, 215; my trans.). However, the possibility of such progress is colored by the indeterminacy of

the eventual outcome when a social Darwinist strain is revealed in Freud's thinking: human extinction may occur despite the spread of civilization because "uncultivated races and backward strata of the population are already multiplying more rapidly than highly cultivated ones" (214; see also Barta).

A different argument suggests that war can thoroughly exceed human agency. In his provocative manifesto entitled *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, Manuel De Landa begins with the premise of a robot historian who might displace anthropocentric theories of war with the recognition that computerization and automation have dissolved age-old distinctions that separate the advisory from the executive capabilities of war making. Relying on the Deleuzian idea of the machinic phylum that blurs the organic and the inorganic in modes of self-organization from atoms to insect colonies to war machines (Deleuze and Guattari 403), De Landa argues that natural as well as artificial systems behave like motors, with a life of their own. Is human agency dangerously obsolescent in a world poised on the brink of nuclear, biological, and computer warfare that can launch without an explicit human decision? In various military-sponsored simulations, computers won "in exercise after exercise . . . [because] the humans participating in battle situations refused to cross the nuclear threshold" (102).

The perpetuity of war could rely on a feedback loop that short-circuits human origination and termination: self-sustaining war (*bellum se ipse alet*) is understood especially well when civil wars ravage states while perversely becoming economic engines that concentrate and distribute power, wealth, and precariousness—witness Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and the former Yugoslavia. These wars are sometimes described as new wars because they rely on light weaponry and child soldiers in the context of major social breakdown. Not the computerized high-tech wars commissioned

by De Landa, these are instead viciously low-tech wars that replace full-fledged military and machine-based encounters with predatory marauding by armed gangs who terrorize civilian populations. Suicide bombing has devastated parts of Asia and the Middle East, allowing states to justify draconian anti-terror tactics, such as detention without trial and police brutality against terror suspects (Asad; Foucault). As Mary Kaldor reminds us, in wars fought up to the early part of the twentieth century, ninety percent of the dead were combatants, whereas by the end of the twentieth century, eighty percent of those killed in wars were noncombatant civilians (100). Therefore, we have the paradox of prognostications of advanced computer war (De Landa) and an actually existing contemporary reality of pre-Westphalian civil wars (van Creveld; Münkler).¹⁴ Is war the repressed of its conceptualization (Rose 24)?

While hot wars continue to rage in several parts of the globe, the twenty-first century brings with it a perception of the asymmetry of state-sponsored and nonstate violence. After World War II, the cold war was fought alongside hot proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam, low-intensity conflicts in the Americas, and fierce wars of decolonization (e.g., in Algeria), as well as regional conflicts producing great civilian devastation in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Meanwhile, spectacular terrorist attacks on the global transportation and communications networks have been launched, their effects multiplied by saturation coverage in the global media.¹⁵ The violent event of 9/11 is inseparable from its real-time transmission across the globe to hundreds of millions of spectators. Some argue that the twenty-first century might also be a return to the nineteenth, with increased resource wars between old and new economic powers and a neocolonial scramble for Africa, where many of the strategic minerals for advanced technological systems are found (Homer-Dixon).

Prognostications of the perpetuity of war lead to the recognition that war is a central element of “the accumulative volume of superfluous evils” besetting the world today (Ophir 17). The question of evil is always already “enframed,” as Adi Ophir argues, and there is no simple way to separate the murderous violence of war from the regimes of representation that enframe it.¹⁶ We have to rethink political precariousness against existential precarity (Butler). While Hannah Arendt understands surplus population to be the ultimate threat to political life and the dignity of the citizen, we may need to recognize how war is integral to a larger system generating multiple forms of vulnerability and injury as constitutive of the human itself (Khanna, “Disposability” and “Indignity”).

Ophir’s systemic taxonomy of the order of evils classifies disappearance, loss, and damage alongside presence, excitation, and suffering as simultaneous forms of deprivation. Being human, we cannot really comprehend personal loss according to the timescale of astrophysics, geology, or for that matter evolutionary biology. At the best, we can move between anthropology and recorded history, even as we wonder whether cyclic and “nomothetic” conceptions of history are appropriate since they tend to rationalize catastrophic events as inevitable (85). Ophir argues convincingly that there is no point looking for the biological infrastructure of suffering and group conflict because “suffering is not necessarily physical and because evolutionary primordiality is not a moral category” (263). War is an extreme case of the superfluous evils around us, evils that range from poverty, exploitation, and unfreedom to our unsustainable growth, fueled by capitalism and leading to species suicide through overpopulation and ecological devastation. The angel of history is now missing in action: war’s detritus may be blown along to a devastated posthuman future.

War can truly be prevented only when we mitigate its background conditions. Capitalism’s constant relocation through globalized

markets is a variant of the policy that continues war by other means. Isn’t our unfolding ecological catastrophe one of human beings’ making proxy war on the planet, a war of one species against all others (Coetzee, *Lives*)? We may be back where we began, with Heraclitus and Coetzee: war is perpetual, and even as it structures and genders human relations, its moral value is indeterminate since that value depends on the specific war and whose side you are on. Can civilization make human beings natural pacifists, as Freud thought, or do we remain incorrigible barbarians? Is our species extinction a tragedy that other species will survive and witness?¹⁷

NOTES

1. For translation and discussion of Heraclitus’s fragment, see Fried 21–42.
2. For Heidegger, this unconcealment brings together art, science, technology, and human intentionality.
3. My co-coordinator, Diana Taylor, discusses such scenarios in her tailpiece to this issue.
4. Clausewitz’s seminal contributions to war as related to politics have led to social science research, even as Jomini’s focus on pure strategy has led to mathematical scenarios. See De Landa.
5. The long disquisitions about the nature of kingship in the Santiparvan section of the *Mahabharata* persuade the victorious Pandava brother Yudhishtira to reestablish sovereignty as countering chaos, a move familiar to modern readers of Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Mao. Thoreau will suggest that Arjuna ought not to have been persuaded to fight (114).
6. See Aravamudan, “Hobbes.” Hobbes’s first major publication, in 1629, was a full translation of Thucydides, entitled *Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War*. The only earlier English translation was published in 1550 by Thomas Nicolls, whose effort was a retranslation from the French of Bishop Seyselles of Marseilles, itself rendered from the Latin of Lorenzo Valla around 1452. Hobbes was also deeply involved in the affairs of the Virginia Company and the Somer Islands (Bermuda) Company, on behalf of his patron, Lord Cavendish, the duke of Devonshire.
7. I put aside the raging debate on whether Hobbes is a latter-day Thucydides or whether the two vary radically in their readings of politics and war. For starkly opposed views, see Johnson; Ahrensford.

8. Elias's magnum opus expounding this thesis, *The Civilizing Process*, was published in 1939, just before World War II.

9. For a discussion of the afterlife of Hobbes's political representational logic, see Aravamudan, "Unity."

10. Freud will say almost the same thing later in his essay "Why War?"

11. The Clausewitz of rational calculation unites with Hobbesian realism, imposing war on the state's chaotic outside while promulgating a command-centered understanding of politics that dominates arguments about defensive and offensive realism. For defensive realism, see Waltz; for offensive realism, Mearsheimer.

12. See, for an example of the literary approach to war, the beautiful description of the sappers and Kip in Ondaatje's *The English Patient*.

13. On the recent proliferation of physical walls and security fences, see Brown; on new forms of power, see Hardt and Negri.

14. As Clausewitzian scholars have pointed out, the attack on Clausewitz as a straw man for the old wars does not take into account the fact that he anticipated the multiple models of war that were pre- and post-Westphalian, even if book 1 of *On War* focuses on the Napoleonic type of war that features state-centered continuation of policy. For the increased confusion of war and humanitarianism as post-Clausewitzian, see Joxe; Kennedy.

15. Tantalizingly, a reporter found a copy of the Everyman edition of Clausewitz in an al-Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan, and a passage that discussed courage was marked (Strachan and Herberg-Rothe 1).

16. As Butler also argues eloquently, "[I]f certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense" (1). Ophir and Butler are indebted to Heidegger's notion of *Gestell*, but we might ask if by staying with representation, mourning, and loss, we are unable to see war in nonanthropocentric frameworks.

17. Tragedy is meant in Hayden White's metahistorical sense.

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